

How to Say Goodbye to the Third Man*

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In (1991), Meinwald initiated a major change of direction in the study of Plato's *Parmenides* and the Third Man Argument. On her conception of the *Parmenides*, Plato's language systematically distinguishes two types or kinds of predication, namely, predications of the kind ' x is *F pros ta alla*' and ' x is *F pros heauto*'. Intuitively speaking, the former is the common, everyday variety of predication, which holds when x is any object (perceptible object or Form) and F is a property which x exemplifies or instantiates in the traditional sense. The latter is a special mode of predication which holds when x is a Form and F is a property which is, in some sense, part of the nature of that Form. Meinwald (1991, p. 75, footnote 18) traces the discovery of this distinction in Plato's work to Frede (1967), who marks the distinction between *pros allo* and *kath' heauto* predications by placing subscripts on the copula 'is'.

Although the strongest support for distinguishing two modes of predication comes from its application to the second, dialectical half of the *Par-*

menides,¹ Meinwald also shows how the distinction points to an ambiguity in one of the principles that plays a key role in the Third Man argument. This was the focus of her paper "Goodbye to the Third Man" (1992). In the present paper, we examine this application to the Third Man; for, though many scholars acknowledge that a distinction in modes of predication helps us to understand the second half of the *Parmenides*, there is not widespread agreement about what the distinction really amounts to and whether it leads to a solution of the Third Man. For example, Durrant (1997) thinks Meinwald's work is 'seminal' but is developed in the wrong direction. He is not opposed to the distinction as such, but argues against its application to self-predicational statements. A second example is Frances (1996), who believes Meinwald's interpretation is 'new and perhaps revolutionary' but that the distinction in predication has implications that Meinwald fails to consider. A third example is Sayre (1994), who says that Meinwald's attribution of the *pros ta alla/pros heauto* distinction to Plato is 'convincingly documented' and that "her application of the distinction to the Third Man regress is a major contribution to the literature on that topic" (p. 115). He suspects, however, that the explication of *pros heauto* predications in terms of 'genus-species' attributions is not as close as she believes. A fourth example is Peterson (1996), who says, "I obviously share the assessment of [Sayre 1994]: 'Meinwald's volume joins a list of six or eight book-length studies of the *Parmenides* produced in this century that any serious future work on the dialogue will have to take into account.' " (p. 169, footnote 4). But she also says (in the same footnote), "I think that her treatments falls somewhat short of solving the third man problem in the way she proposes." Furthermore, she claims not to understand Meinwald's specific definition of *pros heauto* predication, preferring a different one (p. 171). Our final example is Hunt (1997), who says, "That the direction set in *Parmenides II* is essentially the one suggested in this section of the paper is supported by Constance Meinwald's analysis of predications *pros ta alla* and predications *pros heauto*..." (p. 19, footnote 17). These cited passages suggest to us that there is now widespread agreement among scholars that Plato's language did systematically distinguish two kinds of predication, despite their disagreements with Meinwald's specific account of the types of predication

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¹Meinwald shows the distinction can be used to predict why there are eight hypotheses and why pairs of them seem to be repetitious. Nothing we say in the present paper invalidates this application.

and how they should be deployed. More discussion about the notion of ‘multiple modes of predication in Plato’ is given in the Appendix below.

In what follows, we examine the issues that arise in connection with adopting a two-modes-of-predication theory, both to the proper development of the theory of Forms and to the Third Man argument. One of our goals is to show that there is a logically coherent position involving two modes of predication which both (1) allows for a precise statement of the theory of Forms, and (2) removes the threat that the Third Man argument poses. Our interests will not only be textual, for a proper solution of this kind raises serious logical issues that Plato was not in a position to consider. For example, Plato never worried about formulating his theory of Forms so as to remove the threat of Russell’s paradox. But unless the two-modes-of-predication view is reconstructed on rigorous logical grounds, the theory of Forms is vulnerable to a version of Russell’s paradox (as well as other paradoxes). A second goal in the paper is to defend our reconstruction from some of the criticisms leveled against Meinwald’s position. In the course of doing this, it will become apparent that a more rigorous development of the Theory of Forms predicts and resolves some of the valid criticisms directed at Meinwald.

§1: Regimenting the Distinction

The two-modes-of-predication approach lends itself quite naturally to a certain kind of regimentation. The following notational convenience serves quite nicely. The claim ‘ x is F *pros ta alla*’ shall be formally represented as ‘ $F(x)$ ’ (or ‘ Fx ’ when no confusion results), which simply means that x instantiates or exemplifies the property F . The claim ‘ x is F *pros heauto*’ shall be formally represented as ‘ $(x)F$ ’ (or ‘ xF ’ when no confusion results), which means, as a first approximation to be spelled out later, that x is a Form and F is part of its nature (or definition or conception). The Just will have, as part of its nature, not simply the property of being just but also all of the properties implied by being just (including, for example, being virtuous). In what follows, we use ‘ Φ_F ’ to represent the Form of F (i.e., F -ness, as it is often called in the Third Man literature), where ‘ Φ_F ’ is a term to be distinguished from the predicate ‘ F ’. (One good reason for doing this is to remove any threat of a Russell-style paradox from undermining the discussion of self-predication. This will be discussed further in §6.)

Meinwald gives the following examples of predications *pros ta alla*:

Aristides is just.
Northern Dancer is a horse.
The Triangle is intelligible.

On our proposed notational regimentation, these would be represented as follows (where the abbreviations are obvious):

Ja
 Kn
 $I(\Phi_T)$

Notice, in the last example, that the subject of the predication *pros ta alla* is the Form of the Triangle (‘ Φ_T ’), whereas in the first two examples the subjects of the predication are ordinary, perceptible objects.

By contrast, Meinwald gives the following examples of predications *pros heauto*:

The Just is virtuous.
Triangularity is 3-sided.
Dancing moves.
The Just is just.

On our proposed notational regimentation, these would be represented as follows (again the abbreviations are obvious):

$(\Phi_J)V$
 $(\Phi_T)3S$
 $(\Phi_D)M$
 $(\Phi_J)J$

These examples all assert that a certain property is part of the nature (or definition or conception) of the Form designated by the subject term. One may suppose that the truth of these claims is grounded in ‘brute facts’ about the Forms themselves; there is nothing more fundamental about the Forms than facts of this kind. Such facts are what Pelletier (1990) calls ‘the backdrop portion’ of Plato’s theory, i.e., the background metaphysical underpinnings to the theory of Forms. In §5, it will be shown that such facts constitute ‘theorems’ of a proper and complete theory of Forms, once certain obvious relationships among properties are assumed as hypotheses.

Notice that each of these modes of predication is a way of disambiguating the ordinary language claim that ‘ x is F ’. Our notation might be justified as part of the development of what Pelletier (1990) calls the “Philosopher’s Language”. Such a language is logically perspicuous in that it ‘wears its ontological commitments on its sleeve’. On Pelletier’s view, Plato would not be averse to attempts to show how ordinary language statements could be “translated” into the Philosopher’s Language so that underspecified, and even mysterious, ontological commitments of the former are exposed and any air of paradox in its underlying logical foundations is explained away.

Note also that, for the present, it remains an open question whether the property of being F and the ‘corresponding’ Form of F (i.e., the Form that is ‘directly associated’ with the property of being F) are in fact the same thing. It will be a matter of some philosophical investigation as to whether these can be identified. Certainly, in Plato scholarship, it is traditional to identify the Form of F with the property of being F , but there may be logical grounds for thinking that these should be kept distinct. The technical aspects of this topic will be discussed in §6.

§2: The Third Man Argument

Given this regimentation of the two kinds of predication, Meinwald’s approach to the Third Man argument can be explained more clearly. The four principal propositions which play a role in the Third Man Argument can be stated as follows:

One Over The Many (‘OM’): If there are n pairwise-distinct things that are F , then there is a Form of F in which they all participate.

Self-Predication (‘SP’): The Form of F is F .

Non-Identity (‘NI’): If something participates in the Form of F , it is not identical with that Form.

Uniqueness (‘U’): The Form of F is unique.

Note that the first three principles alone jointly yield an infinite regress, given the assumption that there are two distinct F -things, say a and b . For by (OM), there is a Form of F in which both a and b participate. Furthermore, by (NI), the Form of F is distinct from a and b . By (SP),

the Form of F is itself an F -thing. So, by (OM), there is a Form of F in which the Form of F , a , and b all participate. But, by (NI), this second Form of F must be distinct from the first; by (SP), it is itself an F -thing. Thus, (OM) yields yet a third Form, and so on.

However, the larger difficulty for the foundations of Plato’s theory of Forms is not the infinite regress but rather the contradiction that results when the first three principles are coupled with the Uniqueness Principle.² The inconsistency with the Uniqueness Principle arises as soon as the argument reaches the stage where it is established that there is a second (distinct) Form of F .³

Given this formulation of the Third Man argument, Meinwald has a simple story to tell concerning Plato’s method of eliminating both the regress and the contradiction. The simple story is that the Self-Predication Principle is ambiguous. On one reading, the *pros ta alla* reading, this principle is false and so the regress (and contradiction) rests on a false premise. On the other reading, the *pros heauto* reading, the principle is true, but the regress (and contradiction) can’t get its purchase because the mode of predication involved in the other premises are *pros ta alla* predication. It seems clear that Meinwald’s view that the Self-Predication principle is ambiguous can be expressed by representing this principle in our notation in the following two ways:

SPa: $F(\Phi_F)$

SPb: $(\Phi_F)F$

Meinwald says (1992, p. 386):

But we are now clear that that predication [‘The Large is large’] does not claim that The Large itself is large in the same way that the original group of large things is. It therefore does not force on us a new group of large things whose display of a

²The reason that a contradiction poses a larger difficulty is that infinite regresses are not, in and of themselves, logically incoherent. For example, in type theory, one could postulate a 2-place exemplification relation that holds between a property F and an object x , and postulate a 3-place exemplification relation that holds between F , x , and the first exemplification relation, and so on. This ‘Bradley-style’ regress does not result in any logical incoherency.

³This sketch of the Third Man Argument is adapted from Zalta (1983), pp. 43–44. Other ways of formulating the argument can be found in Vlastos (1954), (1969), Strang (1963), Shiner (1970), Cohen (1971), Peterson (1973), as well as many other places.

common feature requires us to crank up our machinery again and produce a new Form.

On the next page, she says, when talking about the Third Man argument (p. 387):

The *Parmenides* has emerged as showing conclusively that Plato does not suppose each property to do its job by having the property that it is. Since his support of the self-predication sentence does not require him to take Man itself as an additional member of the group that displays the feature common to men, and as requiring a new Form to explain the display of this new group, there will be no regress. Plato's metaphysics can say good-bye to the Third Man.

Although Meinwald's story here is quite simple and elegant, it is a bit too simple. One oversimplification is her assumption that all self-predications are to be analyzed as *pros heauto* predications having the logical form of (SPb). The problem with this arises once she claims that the predication 'Justice is eternal' is a *pros ta alla* truth (1991, 101). Frances (1996, 57) has pointed out that if she admits this, she should also admit that every Form is eternal *pros ta alla* and, in particular, the Form of Eternality is eternal *pros ta alla*. This wasn't just a mistake on Meinwald's part because indeed there are true *pros ta alla* predications of the Forms. All the Forms are at rest *pros ta alla*, and so the Form of Rest is at rest *pros ta alla*; all the Forms are eternal *pros ta alla*, and so the Form of Eternality is eternal *pros ta alla*. As soon as one discovers a true *pros ta alla* predication such as "The Form of *F* is *G*", one can often formulate a true *non-pros heauto* self-predication concerning the Form of *G*. Meinwald's theory is too simple because it assumes that all self-predications are *pros heauto*.

Frances also raises the question of whether Meinwald has a *complete* solution to the Third Man, since if even one Form can be self-predicated *pros ta alla*, a Third Man style argument can be developed (assuming that there are two distinct eternal things). Frances has therefore found a 'loophole' in Meinwald's analysis, and we agree with his tentative proposal that a complete solution to the Third Man problem must question the truth of (NI); for, if the Form of Eternality is eternal *pros ta alla*, it would seem that it *can* participate in itself, in contradiction to what (NI) says. Over the next few sections, there will be several occasions to discuss

the issues that arise in connection with (NI); we plan to show that there is a principled way to challenge the truth of that premise.

Another important way in which Meinwald's analysis is oversimplified is that it explores only one of the many consequences of having two modes of predication. First, Meinwald fails to consider whether there is a distinction in the notion of participation that corresponds to the distinction in predication. The fact that *x* is *F pros ta alla* seems to be equivalent to the fact that *x* participates in the Form of *F*. But, then, it would seem that the fact that *x* is *F pros heauto* should be equivalent to a corresponding fact about *x*'s participation in a Form, where the kind of participation involved corresponds to *pros heauto* predications. In what follows, we plan to show that there is a second kind of participation that corresponds with *pros heauto* predication.

Second, Meinwald fails to consider whether there are secondary readings for the other principles that play a role in the Third Man argument. Even if Meinwald is right that no contradiction arises when the Self-Predication principle is always analyzed as a true *pros heauto* predication while all of the other principles are interpreted as true *pros ta alla* predications, Frances (1996) has raised the question of whether the true *pros heauto* reading of Self-Predication together with the (possibly true) *pros heauto* readings of the other principles do or do not lead to paradox. Our analysis will take this idea one step further, since Frances does not consider the corresponding distinction between two kinds of participation. It will become apparent that (OM) has a second reading that involves predication *pros heauto* and its corresponding kind of participation, and that (NI) has a second reading which also involves this latter kind of participation. Once these secondary readings are formulated, the question of whether there is a 'second' Third Man argument will be investigated and answered.

Finally, Meinwald's discussion of Forms and participation has some serious omissions: (1) it is unclear whether her assumed background theory of Forms identifies the Form of *F* with the property of being *F*, and (2) it is unclear just *which* verbal predicates '*F*' are names of Forms.

In the following sections, we build an account which rectifies these oversimplifications and omissions in Meinwald's account. Our account revises and enhances the theory of Forms sketched in Zalta (1983, Chapter II, pp. 41-47), which was also based on the idea that there are two modes of predication. To redevelop this theory, we first reexamine the principles

involved in the Third Man argument in light of the consequences of having two modes of predication. This will provide us with the perspective needed to find a complete solution to the Third Man argument. (Further historical remarks are made in the Appendix about theories that attribute two modes of predication to Plato.)

§3: Participation, (OM), and (NI)

If there are two modes of predication, then a Platonist could plausibly argue that there are two corresponding kinds of participation, since modes of predication are, in some sense, the linguistic mirror of participation. As noted in §2, Meinwald fails to consider this consequence of distinguishing modes of predication. To rectify this omission, consider the following two corresponding kinds of participation. The first kind of participation is linked with predication *pros ta alla*, and the intuition is that y participates_{PTA} in the Form of F whenever y exemplifies or instantiates the corresponding property F . Since y and the Form of F (Φ_F) are two objects, one can think of participation as a relational condition that holds between objects, as follows:

y participates_{PTA} in x if and only if there is property F which is such that: (a) x is (identical to) the Form of F and (b) y exemplifies F

In our formal notation, this would be represented as follows:

$Participates_{PTA}(y, x)$ iff $\exists F(x = \Phi_F \ \& \ Fy)$

In simple terms, y participates_{PTA} in x just in case x is the Form corresponding to some property which y exemplifies.

The application of this definition of participation_{PTA} to some of the examples discussed in §1 results in the following. Aristides participates_{PTA} in the Form of Justice because the Form of Justice is the Form corresponding to some property (namely, the property of being just) which Aristides exemplifies. Similarly, the Triangle participates in the Form of Intelligibility because the Form of Intelligibility is the Form corresponding to some property (namely, the property of being intelligible) which the Triangle exemplifies.

The second kind of participation is correlated with predication *pros heauto*. Although the intuition is that y participates_{PH} in the Form of G whenever y is a Form and the property G is part of the nature (or definition or conception) of y , our definition of participate_{PH} will be framed

more generally, so that *any* object y which has the property G as part of its nature (i.e., which has G *pros heauto*) participates_{PH} in the Form of G . The reason for this greater generality is to allow, in addition to the Forms, other ‘ideal’ objects that have properties *pros heauto* (‘as part of their nature’). (We’ll discuss such objects below.) One can therefore think of participate_{PH} as a completely general, relational condition on objects as follows:

y participates_{PH} in x if and only if there is property F which is such that: (a) x is (identical to) the Form of F , and (b) yF

In our formal notation, this would be represented as follows:

$Participates_{PH}(y, x)$ iff $\exists F(x = \Phi_F \ \& \ yF)$

In simple terms, y participates_{PH} in x just in case x is a Form which corresponds to some property which is part of the nature of y . The application of this definition of participation_{PH} to two of the examples mentioned in §1 results in the following. The Just participates_{PH} in The Virtuous because The Virtuous is a Form which corresponds to some property (namely, the property of being virtuous) that is part of the nature of The Just. Secondly, The Just participates_{PH} in The Just because The Just is a Form which corresponds to some property (namely, the property of being just) that is part of the nature of The Just.

Given the distinctions between two modes of predication and two corresponding kinds of participation, the other principles involved in the Third Man argument can now be disambiguated. Although Meinwald only applied the distinction in predication to the Self-Predication principle, Frances (1996, 59) correctly suggests that a similar ambiguity might infect the other principles involved in the Third Man. However, Frances doesn’t separate (OM) and (NI) as distinct principles, nor does he formulate the principles involved in the Third Man argument in terms of the notion of ‘participation’. He therefore doesn’t consider how the distinction between the two kinds of participation would play a role in disambiguating the other principles involved in the Third Man.⁴ Since our formulations of (OM) and (NI) involve the notion of participation, we shall want to disambiguate these principles in our framework by invoking

⁴See his discussion of the argument on pp. 54-60, and in particular, his items (1) - (6) and (1') - (6').

the different types of participation as well as the two modes of predication. Consider first the One Over the Many Principle. This principle can be disambiguated in one of two ways:⁵

OMa: If there are n pairwise-distinct things that are F (*pros ta alla*), then there is a Form of F in which they all participate_{PTA}.

OMb: If there are n pairwise-distinct things that are F (*pros heauto*), then there is a Form of F in which they all participate_{PH}.

Formally speaking, these become, respectively:

OMa: $[Fy_1 \& \dots \& Fy_n \& y_1 \neq y_2 \& \dots \& y_{n-1} \neq y_n] \rightarrow \exists x[x = \Phi_F \& \text{Participates}_{PTA}(y_1, x) \& \dots \& \text{Participates}_{PTA}(y_n, x)]$

OMb: $[y_1 F \& \dots \& y_n F \& y_1 \neq y_2 \& \dots \& y_{n-1} \neq y_n] \rightarrow \exists x[x = \Phi_F \& \text{Participates}_{PH}(y_1, x) \& \dots \& \text{Participates}_{PH}(y_n, x)]$

The case of the Non-Identity principle is analogous. The notion of participation that figures in this principle must be disambiguated as follows:

NIa: If something participates_{PTA} in the Form of F , it is not identical with that Form.

NIb: If something participates_{PH} in the Form of F , it is not identical with that Form.

In formal notation, these become:

NIa: $\text{Participates}_{PTA}(x, \Phi_F) \rightarrow x \neq \Phi_F$

NIb: $\text{Participates}_{PH}(x, \Phi_F) \rightarrow x \neq \Phi_F$

The standard interpretation of (OM) and (NI) is in terms of (OMa) and (NIa), respectively, although it can now be seen that they each have legitimate ‘b’ readings also.

The final principle, namely Uniqueness, has no ambiguity to it. It simply asserts that, for any property F , there is exactly one thing which is the Form of F . The formal rendition is straightforward:⁶

⁵Actually, four ways. But we may ignore the reading on which *pros ta alla* predication occurs in the antecedent and participation_{PH} occurs in the consequent, and the reading where *pros heauto* occurs in the antecedent but participation_{PTA} in the consequent.

⁶The reader will discover in §5 that the notation ‘ Φ_F ’ can be formally introduced in terms of a well-defined definite description ‘ $\iota x \text{Form}(x, F)$ ’. (So it is not analyzed as

U: $\exists x(x = \Phi_F \& \forall y(y = \Phi_F \rightarrow y = x))$

The above formal renditions of the principles involved in the Third Man argument allow us to restate Meinwald’s position as the following two claims: (1) although (OMa), (SPa), (NIa) and (U) are jointly inconsistent, (SPa) is false; and (2) while (SPb) is true, (OMa), (SPb), (NIa) and (U) are jointly consistent.

We have already cast some doubt on whether Meinwald can claim that (SPa) is false in all cases. (Recall that the Form of Eternality is eternal *pros ta alla*.) However, our present concern is instead whether there is another Third-Man argument lurking in the background, given the context of a two-modes-of-predication position. In such a context, (OMb) and (NIb) become legitimate readings of (OM) and (NI), respectively; and so it is natural to ask whether the argument derived from (OMb), (SPb), (NIb), and (U) lead to a second Third-Man argument.

§4: Is There a Second Third-Man Argument?⁷

Indeed, there is a regress, and for that matter, a contradiction as well. The argument goes precisely as before. Given the assumption that there are two distinct Forms Φ_F and Φ_G that are both H (*pros heauto*) (i.e., which have H as part of their nature), it follows by (OMb) that there is a Form of H , Φ_H , in which they both participate_{PH}. So by (NIb), Φ_F and Φ_G are not identical with Φ_H . But then, by (SPb), Φ_H is H (*pros heauto*). Since Φ_F , Φ_G , and Φ_H are all H (*pros heauto*), it follows by (OMb) that there is a second Form of H in which they all participate_{PH}. But by (NIb), all of these Forms are distinct. To continue the regress, simply apply (SPb) once again to the second Form of H . And a contradiction is immediate once an appeal to (U) is made.

A version of this regress and contradiction was noted by Frances (1996, 59). We have come to similar conclusions about the source of the problems, though we would describe these conclusions somewhat differently,

a name.) The condition ‘ $\text{Form}(x, F)$ ’ will be explicitly defined. Thus, an alternative rendition of the Uniqueness Principle would be:

$$\exists! x \text{Form}(x, F)$$

This claim will be provable. See Theorem 1 in §5.

⁷By this, we mean to ask, is there a second version of the ‘first’ Third Man argument (i.e., the one which occurs in *Parmenides* 132a-b), as opposed to the ‘second’ Third Man argument (which occurs in the *Parmenides* at 132d-133a).

given our separation of (OM) and (NI) and formulation of them in terms of the notion of participation. In terms of our formulations, it is quite possible that Frances would agree with our claim that if (SPb) is true then (NIb) is false. The difference is that we shall actually *prove* the negation of (NIb) from (SPb), whereas he believes that this is merely ‘virtually required’ (1996, 62). Here is a quick proof, which turns on the definition of $\text{participates}_{\text{PH}}$. Pick an arbitrary property P . From (SPb), Φ_P is P (*pros heauto*). But it is then an immediate consequence of the definition of $\text{participates}_{\text{PH}}$ that Φ_P $\text{participates}_{\text{PH}}$ in Φ_P .⁸ So, since Φ_P was chosen arbitrarily, the negation of (NIb) follows from (SPb)—*every* Form $\text{participates}_{\text{PH}}$ in itself, assuming that its corresponding property is part of its nature.

It is interesting that although the two-modes-of-predication approach leads to a second Third Man argument, the approach is potent enough to suggest a solution to both Third Man arguments. With respect to the first Third Man, Meinwald finds (SPa) to be false (as a general principle) and (SPb) to be harmless. With respect to the second Third Man, we find (NIb) to be false and (NIa) to be harmless. So whereas the ideas just discussed allow us to say goodbye to the second Third Man, one must still consider the ‘loophole’ that Frances found in Meinwald’s solution to the first Third Man. Recall that Meinwald’s solution to the first Third Man is vulnerable to the question of whether a Third-Man-style argument can be developed on the basis of such non-*pros heauto* self-predications as ‘The Form of Eternality is eternal’. Again, we postpone discussion of this loophole until after the explicit formulation of a Theory of Forms that will put us in a position to address this problem.

§5: The Logic and Metaphysics of Forms

Since Plato asserted the theory of Forms using natural language, there are a number technical points that he didn’t discuss which are therefore open to further interpretation. It seems clear, however, that Plato would be

⁸If $(\Phi_P)P$, then logic alone guarantees that:

$$\Phi_P = \Phi_P \ \& \ (\Phi_P)P$$

So, by existential generalization, it follows that

$$\exists F[\Phi_P = \Phi_F \ \& \ (\Phi_P)F]$$

This is the definiens for $\text{participates}_{\text{PH}}$ instantiated in both variables to the arbitrarily chosen Form Φ_P .

receptive to a formal development of his views, as evidenced by the respect he showed the Greek geometry of his time.⁹ The following development of the theory of Forms and analysis of the Third Man is therefore proffered as a ‘friendly amendment’ to Plato’s work.

Our friendly amendment is constructed within a more comprehensive axiomatic theory of ‘ideal’ or ‘abstract’ objects. This more encompassing theory provides a conceptual framework within which a Platonic theory of Forms can take shape. Our discussion will proceed in two stages. In the first stage, we describe the more general theory and show how the theory of Forms can be developed as a special case. In the second stage, we discuss the foundational issues that affect the consistency and coherence of the underlying logic. This second stage takes place in the next section.

The first stage will proceed as follows. After developing the primitive notions of the more encompassing theory, we use them to define the notion of a Form. The existence of Forms is then proved from the axioms of the more encompassing theory. The theorems of this system will include the claim that there is a unique Form of F for each property F . Furthermore, the notions of participation will be defined in terms of the primitive notions of the encompassing theory, and the (OM) principles (both a and b versions) will be derived as further consequences. (SPb) is derived from the general theory, but (SPa) is shown to have a counterexample and so is not true as a principle of the general theory (though some instances of (SPa) can be consistently added to the theory of Forms). Finally, both readings of (NI) are shown to be false as principles of the general theory.

The general theory is a notational variant of Zalta (1983) and (1988), which begins by axiomatizing two primitive modes of predication. The formula ‘ Fx ’ is used to assert that x *exemplifies* F (alternatively, that x *instantiates* F), and ‘ xF ’ is used to assert that x *encodes* F (alternatively, F *is constitutive of* x). However, we *relabel* Zalta’s distinction between ‘abstract’ (‘ $A!x$ ’) and ‘ordinary’ (‘ $O!x$ ’) objects as the distinction between

⁹With all due respect for Professor Cherniss, we strongly disagree with his assessment of Vlastos’ attempt to add clarity to the formulation of Plato’s Third Man argument by applying the idiom of modern logic. In (1957), Cherniss says (p. 257):

In his study, which has started a still-rising flood of literature, intended to clarify Plato’s text but tending to overwhelm it with the symbols of modern logic, Vlastos contends . . .

Vlastos (1954) is a landmark in the analysis of this argument, and we accept its presupposition that one way to show that a theory is consistent and worthy of being taken seriously is to try to reconstruct it using modern logical methods.

ideal and *real* objects.¹⁰ Real, ordinary, everyday objects can only exemplify their properties—it is an axiom that $O!x \rightarrow \neg\exists F(xF)$. By contrast, ideal objects both exemplify properties as well as encode them. The properties that ideal objects encode, unlike the properties that they exemplify, are the ones by which they are individuated. It is important to recognize that our original gloss (in §1) for the notation ‘ xF ’ used here to express encoding predications is now somewhat too narrow. The original gloss for ‘ xF ’ was: x is a Form and F is part of its nature. However, since the Forms shall constitute only a subclass of the class of ideal objects, the claim that x *encodes* F (‘ xF ’) can be understood more simply as: F is part of the nature of x . But since it is axiomatic that ordinary objects do not encode properties, our original gloss on ‘ xF ’ needs only to be modified as follows: x is an ideal object and F is part of its nature.

Now if ‘ Ix ’ is used to assert that ‘ x is ideal’, then the two most important principles of the theory are: (1) a ‘comprehension’ principle which tells us under what conditions there are ideal objects that encode properties, and (2) an identity principle, which gives us a criterion of identity for ideal objects:

$$\exists x(Ix \& \forall F(xF \equiv \phi)), \text{ where } \phi \text{ has no free } xs$$

$$Ix \& Iy \& \forall F(xF \equiv yF) \rightarrow x=y^{11}$$

¹⁰This distinction is intended to capture Plato’s distinction between ‘intelligible’ vs. ‘perceptible’ objects in the *Republic* and elsewhere. Others might use ‘transcendent’ vs. ‘worldly’ to label this distinction.

¹¹The reader should note that the identity sign here is not a primitive notion of the theory. In fact, in the official formulation of the theory, this statement of identity conditions is recast as part of a definition which says that ‘ $x=y$ ’ holds whenever either (1) x and y are both real (ordinary) objects and exemplify the same properties, or (2) x and y are both abstract, ideal objects and encode the same properties. This means that identity claims contain encoding predications, a point which will become relevant in §6, when we formulate a comprehension principle for properties and discuss the Bradley regress.

It is also important to point out that in addition to these identity conditions for (ideal) objects, there is a corresponding identity condition on properties. This, too, is cast as a definition in the strict formulation of the theory:

$$F=G =_{df} \forall x(xF \equiv xG)$$

This identity condition on properties will supplement the comprehension principle for properties that we discuss in §6. It is consistent with the idea that properties can be individuated even more finely than functions from worlds to sets of individuals, for it allows for the possibility of distinct properties that are necessarily exemplified by the same objects (e.g., being equiangular and being equilateral).

The comprehension principle asserts that for any condition ϕ on properties, there is an ideal object that encodes all and only the properties satisfying the condition. Thus, for example, consider the condition ‘ F is identical to the property of being in motion’ (‘ $F=M$ ’). This condition is satisfied by exactly one property, namely, the property of being in motion. So, the following instance of the comprehension principle asserts that there is an ideal object which encodes the property of being motion, and only this property:

$$\exists x(Ix \& \forall F(xF \equiv F=M))$$

By the principle of identity, there is exactly one ideal object that encodes the single property of being in motion. For if there were two such ideal objects, they would have to differ with respect to one of their encoded properties; but since they each encode just one property, and it’s the same property, this can’t happen.

To develop a second example of an ideal object, let ‘ $G \Rightarrow F$ ’ stand for the claim that the property G entails the property F . (For the purposes of this paper, define this notion in terms of necessity as follows: ‘ $G \Rightarrow F$ ’ abbreviates $\Box\forall x(Gx \rightarrow Fx)$.) Then consider the claim that the property of being in motion entails the property F (‘ $M \Rightarrow F$ ’). In this case the following instance of the first principle asserts that there is an ideal object which encodes all and only the properties entailed by the property of being in motion:

$$\exists x(Ix \& \forall F(xF \equiv M \Rightarrow F))$$

Again, it follows from the principle of identity that there is a unique such object (by reasoning analogous to that used above).

As a third example, consider a rather different condition on properties. Let ‘ s ’ denote Socrates and consider the condition ‘Socrates exemplifies F ’ (‘ Fs ’). Then the following instance of the first principle says that there is an ideal object that encodes just the properties Socrates exemplifies:

$$\exists x(Ix \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fs))$$

Note that whereas the identity condition on properties quantifies over objects, the identity condition on (ideal) objects quantifies over properties. There is no formal circularity involved here, since the defined notation can be eliminated (expanded) in terms of primitive notation.

Whereas Socrates is a real object, this unique ideal object is something like Socrates' complete individual concept—this 'concept' contains (i.e., encodes) all the properties Socrates exemplifies.

The above constitute three examples of the many different types of ideal objects. The third example might prove to be interesting for the study of Leibniz. The first example could be used to develop a 'thin' conception of Plato's Forms—the nature of such entities is constituted by a *single* property.¹² However, this object would not give a satisfactory explanation of the fact that Forms have a more complex nature. For example, The Form of Justice contains virtue as part of its nature. So, in what follows, we hope to show that ideal objects analogous to the second example have many of the features that Plato attributed to Forms. Using this example as a guide, here is a general definition of what it is to be a Form of G (for any property G): x is a Form of G iff x is an ideal object that encodes all and only the properties entailed by G . In formal terms, this becomes:

$$x \text{ is a Form of } G \text{ ('Form}(x, G)\text{')} =_{df} Ix \ \& \ \forall F(xF \equiv G \Rightarrow F)$$

It follows from this, by the identity principle for ideal objects, that for any property G , there is a unique ideal object which is a Form of G ; this is our first theorem:

$$\textit{Theorem 1: } \forall G \exists ! x \text{Form}(x, G)$$

(There couldn't be two distinct Forms of G that encode exactly the properties implied by G , since distinct ideal objects have to differ with respect to at least one encoded property.) Since (for any property G) there is a unique ideal object which is a Form of G , the description 'The Form of G ' is always well-defined and the notation ' Φ_G ' is hereby introduced as an abbreviation for this description:

$$\Phi_G =_{df} \iota x \text{Form}(x, G)$$

So, for example, the Form of Justice is the ideal object that encodes all and only the properties entailed by the property of being just. Assuming that the property of being virtuous is entailed by the property of being just, this Form will encode the property of being virtuous as well as any other property entailed by the property of being just.

¹²This is the ideal object used to develop the theory of Forms in Zalta (1983), Chapter II. See also Parsons (1980), Chapter 8, Section 5.

In light of the foregoing definitions, one can now say that an object x is a *Form* just in case there is some property G such that x is identical to the Form of G :

$$x \text{ is a Form} =_{df} \exists G(x = \Phi_G)$$

This carves out a precise subclass of the ideal objects. (In a later section of the paper, we consider whether this subclass of the ideal objects is still too inclusive for Plato. One may want to pare down the list of legitimate properties for which corresponding Forms can be defined.) It is worth noting that our two modes of predication, Fx and xF , together with the definition of Φ_G , yield an interpretation of the notation ' $F(\Phi_G)$ ' and ' $(\Phi_G)F$ ' used earlier in the paper. Clearly, then, under our friendly amendment, when Meinwald says Φ_G is F *pros ta alla*, the proper regimentation is that $F(\Phi_G)$, and when Meinwald says Φ_G is F *pros heauto*, the proper regimentation is that $(\Phi_G)F$.

Notice that our definition of *the* Form of G presumes some logic of definite descriptions. For the purposes of this paper, descriptions are primitive terms, not contextually defined à la Russell. Since we have proved that the description ' Φ_G ' is always well-defined, we can avail ourselves of the simplest logic of descriptions. This logic immediately yields the Uniqueness Principle, namely, $\exists x(x = \Phi_F \ \& \ \forall y(y = \Phi_F \rightarrow y = x))$, as a theorem. It is a trivial consequence of Theorem 1 and the definition of ' Φ_G ' (recall also footnote 6).

The logic of descriptions is also required to establish the following consequence, which proves useful when reasoning about Forms:

$$\textit{Lemma: } (\Phi_G)F \equiv G \Rightarrow F^{13}$$

¹³The simplicity of this *Lemma* is deceptive. Its derivation appeals to the following Russellian principle governing definite descriptions:

$$\psi_y^{\iota x \phi} \equiv \exists x(\phi \ \& \ \forall z(\phi_z^z \rightarrow z = x) \ \& \ \psi_y^x), \text{ where } \psi \text{ is an atomic formula}$$

To prove our *Lemma* in the left-to-right direction, assume that the left hand side of the *Lemma* is true; i.e., assume $(\Phi_G)F$. Now one can derive information from this fact by appealing to the instance of the Russellian principle in which the formula ψ is the atomic encoding formula ' yF ' and the description $\iota x \phi$ is Φ_G . So let $\phi = 'Ix \ \& \ \forall H(xH \equiv G \Rightarrow H)'$. Then the relevant instance of the Russellian principle governing descriptions is:

$$(\Phi_G)F \equiv \exists x[(Ix \ \& \ \forall H(xH \equiv G \Rightarrow H)) \ \& \ \forall z(Iz \ \& \ \forall H(zH \equiv G \Rightarrow H) \rightarrow z = x) \ \& \ xF]$$

Since $(\Phi_G)F$ is an assumption, it follows that:

In other words, the Form of G is F *pros heauto* just in case G implies F . The logic of definite descriptions ensures that the Form of G will encode just those properties F which satisfy the Form's identifying description. So the Form of G will encode all and only those properties that are entailed by G .

This *Lemma* can be used to derive the examples of predication *pros heauto* described in §1, if given certain uncontroversial facts about entailment. For example, from the premise that the property of being just entails the property of being virtuous, it follows that The Just is virtuous *pros heauto* (i.e., $(\Phi_J)V$). From the premise that the property of being a triangle entails the property of being 3-sided, it follows that Triangularity is 3-sided *pros heauto* (i.e., $(\Phi_T)3S$). And from the premise that the property of dancing entails the property of being in motion, it follows that Dancing moves *pros heauto* (i.e., $(\Phi_D)M$). These are precisely the examples of *pros heauto* predications described in §1, and we have now discharged our promise to show that such facts constitute 'theorems' of a proper and complete theory of Forms once certain obvious relationships among properties are assumed as hypotheses.

Given the resources now at our disposal, the two readings of the Self-Predication principle described in §2 take on a more exact significance:

SPa: $F(\Phi_F)$

SPb: $(\Phi_F)F$

The first of these asserts that the Form of F exemplifies the property F . The second asserts that the Form of F encodes F . Given the definition of Φ_F , the explicit universal generalization of (SPb) is provable:

Theorem 2: $\forall F[(\Phi_F)F]$

Clearly this follows from our *Lemma* and the fact that the property of being F is one of the properties entailed by being F . By contrast, when

$$\exists x[(Ix \& \forall H(xH \equiv G \Rightarrow H)) \& \forall z(Iz \& \forall H(zH \equiv G \Rightarrow H) \rightarrow z=x) \& xF]$$

Call an arbitrary such object ' a '. It then follows that:

$$(Ia \& \forall H(aH \equiv G \Rightarrow H)) \& \forall z(Iz \& \forall H(zH \equiv G \Rightarrow H) \rightarrow z=a) \& aF$$

Now instantiate the second half of the first conjunct to F , which yields $aF \equiv G \Rightarrow F$. Then use the last conjunct, namely, aF , to yield the conclusion that $G \Rightarrow F$.

The right-to-left direction of the *Lemma* is left as an exercise, noting that one must use the assumption $G \Rightarrow F$ and appeal to Theorem 1.

reasonable assumptions are added to the theory, (SPa) is not universally true. For example, it seems reasonable to suggest (and, moreover, it is consistent with the theory to assert) that ideal objects do not move (i.e., they do not exemplify the property of being in motion). So, the Form of Motion does not exemplify the property of being in motion. This, therefore, is a counterexample to (SPa). Of course, given certain other reasonable assumptions, some forms *will* exemplify their identifying properties. For example, given the assumption that ideal objects are always at rest, it follows that the Form of Rest exemplifies being at rest. (Such assumptions can be consistently added to the theory.)

But even without making such assumptions, one can prove that some Forms *must* exemplify their defining property. By Theorem 1, the Form directly corresponding to the property of being ideal, Φ_I , exists. And, by definition, this Form exemplifies the property of being ideal. This Form will crop up again when we discuss the fate of (NI) on the present theory.

Note how the two definitions of participation described in §1 can be seamlessly incorporated into the present framework. The following two consequences justify both the two definitions of participation and the definition of ' Φ_F ', since they demonstrate the equivalence of each mode of predication with its corresponding kind of participation in a Form:¹⁴

¹⁴To prove Theorem 3, one establishes that the biconditional holds for an arbitrarily chosen property P and object a . So, for the left-to-right direction assume Pa . Then by the laws of identity, it follows that $\Phi_P = \Phi_P \& Pa$. It follows that:

$$\exists F(\Phi_P = \Phi_F \& Fa)$$

And then by the definition of $\text{participates}_{\text{PTA}}$, it follows that $\text{Participates}_{\text{PTA}}(a, \Phi_P)$, which is what had to be shown.

For the right-to-left direction, assume $\text{Participates}_{\text{PTA}}(a, \Phi_P)$. Then by the definition of $\text{participates}_{\text{PTA}}$, it follows that:

$$\exists F(\Phi_P = \Phi_F \& Fa)$$

Let Q be an arbitrary such property. So $\Phi_P = \Phi_Q \& Qa$. It follows from the fact that $\Phi_P = \Phi_Q$ that these two Forms encode exactly the same properties. Since Φ_P encodes P (by Theorem 2), it follows that Φ_Q encodes P . But, then, by our Lemma, it follows that $Q \Rightarrow P$. So from the above fact that Qa , it follows that Pa , which is what had to be shown.

To prove Theorem 4, one again establishes that the biconditional holds for an arbitrarily chosen property P and object a . For the left-to-right direction, assume aP . Then by the laws of identity, $\Phi_P = \Phi_P \& aP$. So, it follows that:

$$\exists F(\Phi_P = \Phi_F \& aF)$$

Now, by the definition of $\text{participates}_{\text{PH}}$, it follows that $\text{Participates}_{\text{PH}}(a, \Phi_P)$, which is what had to be shown. The right-to-left direction is left as an exercise.

Theorem 3: $Fx \equiv Participates_{PTA}(x, \Phi_F)$

Theorem 4: $xF \equiv Participates_{PH}(x, \Phi_F)$

One nice way to further justify both our definitions of participation and our definition of ‘ Φ_F ’ is to show that they offer us a proper Platonic analysis of a classic argument. Consider:

Socrates is a man.

Man is mortal.

Socrates is mortal.

On a Platonic analysis of this argument, both the minor premise and the conclusion can be analyzed as asserting either that Socrates has a certain property *pros ta alla*, or equivalently (in light of Theorem 3), that Socrates participates_{PTA} in a certain Form. The major premise can be analyzed as asserting either that the Form of Man has a certain property *pros heauto*, or equivalently (in light of Theorem 4), that the Form of Man participates_{PH} in the Form of Mortality. Let us, then, formally develop these analyses in terms of the two kinds of participation. Let ‘ s ’ denote Socrates, ‘ M_1 ’ denote the property of being a man, and ‘ M_2 ’ denote the property of being mortal. Then the Platonic analysis of this argument would go as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l} Participates_{PTA}(s, \Phi_{M_1}) \\ Participates_{PH}(\Phi_{M_1}, \Phi_{M_2}) \\ \hline Participates_{PTA}(s, \Phi_{M_2}) \end{array}$$

By appealing to Theorems 3, 4, and the above Lemma, it is straightforward to show that the conclusion follows from the premises.¹⁵

A further, equally important justification of our definitions of participation and our definition of ‘ Φ_F ’ is the fact that both versions of the One Over the Many Principle (i.e., (OMa) and (OMb)) are derivable:¹⁶

¹⁵By Theorem 3, the first premise implies $M_1(s)$. By Theorem 4, the second premise implies $(\Phi_{M_1})M_2$. By the Lemma, this latter implies that $M_1 \Rightarrow M_2$. So, $M_2(s)$. But, again by Theorem 3, the conclusion now follows.

¹⁶For the proof of Theorem 5, assume the antecedent, for arbitrarily chosen objects a_1, \dots, a_n :

$$Fa_1 \& \dots \& Fa_n \& a_1 \neq a_2 \& \dots \& a_{n-1} \neq a_n$$

Theorem 5: $[Fy_1 \& \dots \& Fy_n \& y_1 \neq y_2 \& \dots \& y_{n-1} \neq y_n] \rightarrow \exists x[x = \Phi_F \& Participates_{PTA}(y_1, x) \& \dots \& Participates_{PTA}(y_n, x)]$

Theorem 6: $[y_1 F \& \dots \& y_n F \& y_1 \neq y_2 \& \dots \& y_{n-1} \neq y_n] \rightarrow \exists x[x = \Phi_F \& Participates_{PH}(y_1, x) \& \dots \& Participates_{PH}(y_n, x)]$

So both readings of the foremost principle of Plato’s theory of Forms are derivable in the present setting.

We turn at last to the discussion of the Non-Identity Principle. Consider first (NIb). On the theory presented here, (NIb) is obviously false. Our proof in §4 that the negation of (NIb) follows from (SPb) takes on new significance in the context of our theory of Forms. This proof can be recast in terms of the theorems proved so far to show that the negation of (NIb), which is the following existentially quantified claim, is a theorem:

Theorem 7: $\exists x \exists F [Participates_{PH}(x, \Phi_F) \& x = \Phi_F]$

To see that this is a theorem, pick any property P and consider the Form of P . By Theorem 2, it follows that the Form of P encodes the property of being P . So by instantiating Theorem 4 to the Form of P and to the property P , it follows that the Form of P participates_{PH} in itself. So, after conjoining this last fact with the self-identity of the Form of P , Theorem 7 follows by generalizing on P and the Form of P .

This proof formally captures the ‘quick proof’ of the negation of (NIb) given in the previous section. Thus a Platonist who adopts a two-modes-of-predication view is entitled to something stronger than Frances’ claim that the rejection of (NIb) is ‘virtually required’. Indeed, not only is the rejection of (NIb) provable, but there is a stronger fact about participates_{PH} that our proof of Theorem 7 reveals, namely, that *every* Form participates_{PH} in itself.¹⁷

Then, by Theorem 3, it follows that a_1, \dots, a_n participate_{PTA} in the Form of F :

$$Participates_{PTA}(a_1, \Phi_F) \& \dots \& Participates_{PTA}(a_n, \Phi_F)$$

Now conjoin this with the statement that the Form of F is self-identical:

$$\Phi_F = \Phi_F \& Participates_{PTA}(a_1, \Phi_F) \& \dots \& Participates_{PTA}(a_n, \Phi_F)$$

So by existential generalization, the desired consequent of Theorem 5 is established:

$$\exists x[x = \Phi_F \& Participates_{PTA}(a_1, x) \& \dots \& Participates_{PTA}(a_n, x)]$$

Since the a_i were arbitrarily chosen, Theorem 5 holds for any objects y_1, \dots, y_n .

The proof of Theorem 6 is exactly analogous and appeals to Theorem 4.

¹⁷The proof essentially follows the proof of Theorem 7. Suppose a is an arbitrary Form. Then, by definition, there is a property F , say P , such that $a = \Phi_P$. Now by

Theorem 8: $\forall x[Form(x) \rightarrow Participates_{PH}(x, x)]$

The moral to be drawn from this is that the universal truth of (SPb) and the definition of $participates_{PH}$ implies the universal falsehood of (NIb).

Our discussion of (NIa) begins with the observation that the present theory is consistent with the claims of Platonists who postulate the existence of such Forms as the Form of Rest, Eternality, Intelligibility, Being, etc., as well as with the claims of more liberal Platonists who extend Plato's theory so as to assert the existence of a Form corresponding to *any* property whatsoever (including, for example, negative properties). From the plausible assumption that some of these Forms participate_{PTA} in themselves,¹⁸ such extensions of the theory immediately yield the consequence that (NIa) is false. However, even without the addition of any such assumptions, the present formulation of the theory of Forms yields a tidy counterexample to the general statement of (NIa). For consider again the example of the Form of the property of being ideal, i.e., Φ_I . Since every Form (including Φ_I) by definition exemplifies the property of being ideal, it follows from Theorem 3 (instantiated to I) that Φ_I participates_{PTA} in itself. So one can prove the existence of something which participates_{PTA} in Φ_I and which is identical to Φ_I , namely, Φ_I itself. This counterexample constitutes a proof of the negation of (NIa):

Theorem 9: $\exists x \exists F [Participates_{PTA}(x, \Phi_F) \ \& \ x = \Phi_F]$

Indeed, it follows not just that there is a counterexample to (NIa), but that every Form that yields a true substitution instance of (SPa) will be a counterexample to (NIa). The examples discussed earlier in this paragraph attest to this fact.

Thus, the theory suggests that the way to say goodbye to the Third Man argument is not only to accept Meinwald's view that there two kinds of predication which create an ambiguity in the (SP) principle, but also to realize that a full explication of a two-modes-of-predication theory entails the rejection of both readings of (NI). This closes the 'loophole'

Theorem 2, $(\Phi_P)P$, and so by Theorem 4, Φ_P participates_{PH} in Φ_P . But since $a = \Phi_P$, it follows that a participates_{PH} in a .

¹⁸It is straightforwardly Platonic to think that the Form of Rest is at rest *pros ta alla*, that the Form of Eternality is eternal *pros ta alla*, that the Form of Intelligibility is intelligible *pros ta alla*, etc. However, those with a more liberal theory of Forms might equally well claim that the Form of Not-Red is not-red *pros ta alla*, on the grounds that such a Form is an ideal object and hence, necessarily, does not exemplify being colored.

that Frances discovered in Meinwald's analysis of the Third Man. The existence of non-*pros heauto* self-predications can't regenerate the contradiction if both readings of (NI) are rejected.¹⁹

§6: Consistency and Coherence of the Metaphysics

The general theory described and applied in §5 is consistent and provably so.²⁰ However, there is a constellation of intriguing logical features that work together to keep the theory coherent. In this section, many of these features are explained, to show how the theory avoids various paradoxes. Reconstructions of Plato should address such paradoxes, since the logic of self-predication is precariously perched on the abyss of inconsistency. In the course of our explanations, our rigorous development of the two-modes-of-predication theory also puts to rest two outstanding questions for Meinwald's version of this theory, namely, (1) Are the Forms identical with properties?, and (2) Which verbal predicates designate properties?

The first and foremost worry for a theory of Forms is to avoid the Russell paradox. If Forms were identical with properties and were predicable of themselves, then a version of the Russell paradox would be generated. For if properties are Forms, there would be a Form corresponding to the property of not-exemplifying-oneself—the Form of Non-self-exemplification. Now regardless of whether this property is true or false of this Form, it would be easy to establish that this particular Form exemplifies itself (or participates in itself) iff it does not.

On our analysis of this paradox, the issue is whether the very same thing can be both a predicable entity and the subject of a predication. On our view, Forms are to be distinguished from properties on the grounds

¹⁹These conclusions extend Zalta's conclusion (1983, 44) in numerous ways:

We may conclude, with respect to the Third Man Argument, that our theory rules that (OMP) and (U) (Uniqueness Principle) are true, that (NI) is false, and that (SP) has a true reading and a false one. Since we abandon the (NI) principle, further research should be directed toward the question of how deeply Plato was committed to it.

The present paper extends this conclusion by introducing a distinction between two kinds of participation, offering two separate readings of both (OM) and (NI), investigating two possible formulations of the Third Man argument, and demonstrating that both readings of (NI) are false.

²⁰Both P. Aczel and D. Scott have found models. Aczel's model was described in Zalta (1997), and Scott's model is described in Zalta (1983) Appendix I.

that the latter are predicable entities and the former are not.²¹ This is reflected by the fact that in our Philosopher’s Language, predicates cannot stand in the subject (i.e., argument) position of exemplification predications (nor can predicates stand in the ‘ x ’ position in the encoding predication ‘ xF ’). Thus, our language is ‘typed’. However, unlike most typed languages, which rule out *any* method of predicating a property F of itself, our language allows us to *indirectly* predicate F of itself by allowing one to predicate F of the Form of F . This viewpoint simply recognizes properties as ‘unsaturated’ and Forms as self-subsistent entities, and has the virtue of respecting the grammar of our talk about the Forms. We use full noun phrases (such as ‘the Form (of) F ’), as opposed to predicates, to refer to the Forms, whereas we use predicates (such as ‘is F ’), as opposed to complete noun phrases, to “say something about” the Forms. In addition, we use gerunds (such as ‘being red’ and ‘being non-round’) to refer to properties and we avail ourselves of the usual λ -notation ‘ $[\lambda\alpha\phi]$ ’, where this may be read ‘the property of being such that ϕ ’. Given this kind of regimentation, *no* property is designated by the expression ‘being a property that fails to exemplify itself’, for that would have to be represented by a λ -expression which violates type restrictions on the grounds that it involves a predicate in subject position (for example, $[\lambda F \neg F(F)]$). The fact that our theory both avoids Russell’s paradox yet consistently allows for a form of self-predication is important evidence

²¹Our framework also suggests an interesting reason to distinguish Forms and properties, namely, that if Forms and properties were identified, Plato’s primary principle governing the Forms, the One Over the Many Principle (OMa), would turn out to be nothing more than a mere logical truth. Note that on the present theory, (OMa) is a proper thesis of metaphysics—non-logical, metaphysical axioms are essential to the proof. But consider what would happen if (OMa) were analyzed in terms of the following definitions:

The Form of $F =_{df}$ F

x participates in $F =_{df}$ Fx

Given these definitions, the claim:

OMa’: If there are two distinct F -things, then there is a Form of F in which they both participate.

would have to be represented as follows:

OMa’: $x \neq y \ \& \ Fx \ \& \ Fy \rightarrow \exists G(G = F \ \& \ Gx \ \& \ Gy)$

But this version of (OMa) is simply a logical truth in second-order logic. In other words, once one introduces properties in the usual way (i.e., in terms of second-order language and logic), construes the Forms as properties, and construes participation as mere exemplification, then (OMa’) falls out as a theorem of logic.

in favor of distinguishing between Φ_F and F . Theorists such as Meinwald and Vlastos, who seem to identify Forms and properties on the grounds that this is the most sympathetic understanding of Plato, owe us a consistency proof of their respective theories of Forms. Without such a proof, *our* theory may be the more sympathetic understanding of Plato.

There are several other interesting logical questions that arise in connection with a two-modes-of-predication theory. Some of these will be discussed in the Appendix; but others are of more immediate concern. For instance, one might wonder whether *pros heauto* predications *imply* *pros ta alla* predications. In formal terms, this is the question of whether xF implies Fx . Intuitively, such an implication should be rejected. Consider any property that all Forms lack (i.e., do not exemplify), such as being in motion. The Form that encodes this property, e.g., the Form of Motion, will be a counterexample to this implication. Moreover, in the case of certain complex properties, it is *provable* that no such general implication holds. Consider an arbitrary property G and the complex property of being an object that both exemplifies G and fails to exemplify G (in λ -notation: $[\lambda x Gx \ \& \ \neg Gx]$). Call this property G^* . By Theorem 1, there is a Form of G^* , i.e., Φ_{G^*} . So, by Theorem 2, Φ_{G^*} encodes G^* ; i.e., $(\Phi_{G^*})G^*$. So if *pros heauto* predication implies *pros ta alla* predication, it would follow that $G^*(\Phi_{G^*})$. But, then, it would follow by the definition of G^* , that $G(\Phi_{G^*})$ and $\neg G(\Phi_{G^*})$. That is to say, the Form of G^* would make a contradiction true. Hence the principle is, in its general form, false:

Theorem 10: $\neg \forall F \forall x (xF \rightarrow Fx)$

i.e., there is some property F and object x such that x encodes F but doesn’t exemplify F .

Although our theory rules that *pros heauto* predications do not always imply *pros ta alla* predications, it does allow that some Forms can exemplify what they encode. This was evident in the case of the Form of being ideal (which provably both encodes and exemplifies the property of being ideal). But it was also noted that the theory is consistent with such claims as that the Form of Eternality is eternal *pros ta alla*, that the Form of Rest is at rest *pros ta alla*, and that the Form of Intelligibility is intelligible *pros ta alla*, etc. If there are negative Forms (see below), such as those corresponding the property of being a non-Greek or the property of being not red, then these constitute further cases where one and the same property can be predicated both *pros heauto* and *pros ta alla* of a

given Form.

The final paradox that should be discussed is a slightly more complicated version of Russell's paradox. It concerns the complex property of being an object that encodes a property that it doesn't exemplify, or in terms of Platonic predication, being an object that has some property *pros heauto* which it doesn't have *pros ta alla*.²² In λ -notation, this property would be formulable as $[\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)]$. The paradox is that if there were such a property, the Form corresponding to it would exemplify it iff it does not.²³ The solution to this paradox brings us directly to the second question to be addressed in this section, namely, which predicates designate properties?

The most inclusive treatment of properties would be one on which the encompassing theory asserts that *any* predicate designates a property. But that would lead directly to the above paradox. The next most inclusive treatment of properties would be one on which the encompassing theory asserts that any predicate *which is formulable without pros heauto predications* designates a property. This treatment is expressible in terms of a *comprehension* principle for properties:²⁴

²²The paradox discussed in what follows is a variant of 'Clark's Paradox', which was described in Clark (1978, 184), and discussed in both Rapaport (1978, 171-172) and Zalta (1983, 158-9).

²³To see this, suppose there were such a property as $[\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)]$ and call it ' K '. Then, by the comprehension principle for ideal objects, the following would be true:

$$\exists x(Ix \& \forall F(xF \equiv K \Rightarrow F))$$

Since there is a unique such object, call this the Form of K (' Φ_K '). By definition of Φ_K :

$$\forall F[(\Phi_K)F \equiv K \Rightarrow F]$$

It is now provable that Φ_K exemplifies K iff it does not.

(\rightarrow) Suppose $K(\Phi_K)$. Then, by definition of K , there exists a property, say P , such that $(\Phi_K)P \& \neg P(\Phi_K)$. From the first conjunct and the definition of Φ_K , it follows that $K \Rightarrow P$, i.e., $\Box \forall x(Kx \rightarrow Px)$. So $\forall x(Kx \rightarrow Px)$. Now this fact together with the second conjunct ($\neg P(\Phi_K)$) implies that $\neg K(\Phi_K)$, contrary to hypothesis.

(\leftarrow) So suppose that $\neg K(\Phi_K)$, i.e., $\neg[\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)](\Phi_K)$. But the following is an instance of the logical axiom of λ -conversion:

$$[\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)](\Phi_K) \equiv \exists G[(\Phi_K)G \& \neg G(\Phi_K)]$$

It therefore follows that $\neg \exists G[(\Phi_K)G \& \neg G(\Phi_K)]$, i.e., $\forall G[(\Phi_K)G \rightarrow G(\Phi_K)]$. But since $K \Rightarrow K$, it follows that $(\Phi_K)K$ (by definition of Φ_K), and so $K(\Phi_K)$, which is a contradiction.

²⁴For those interested in the details of object theory, it might be helpful to point out that the 'contains no encoding formulas' restriction can be relaxed to 'contains

$$\exists F \forall x(Fx \equiv \phi),$$

where ϕ contains no free F s and contains no encoding formulas

This principle allows for negative and disjunctive properties, as in the following examples:

$$\exists F \forall x(Fx \equiv \neg Gx)$$

$$\exists F \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx \vee Hx)$$

Clearly, if there are such properties, then there will be Forms corresponding to them, given Theorem 1. However, this formulation suffices to rule out Forms defined in terms of predicates containing encoding formulas. This resolves the paradox discussed in the previous paragraph. There is no property corresponding to the predicate "is an object that has *pros heauto* a property that it fails to have *pros ta alla*". The λ -expression $[\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)]$ does not denote a property (and in the formal development of the encompassing theory, is not even well-formed).

Moreover, note that this comprehension principle disallows the conditions ' y participates_{PTA} in x ' and ' y participates_{PH} in x ' from defining relations, which in turn sidesteps potential Bradley-style regresses. Here is why. Recall (footnote 2) that the Bradley regress gets started by supposing that predication *pros ta alla* is in fact a *relation* between an object and its property, and that a further predication relates this relation to the object and its property, etc. But by treating *pros ta alla* predication as a *mode* of predication rather than a new relation, the theory avoids the Bradley regress. However, despite this one might think that the Bradley regress could reassert itself, in light of Theorem 3; for, this asserts that the exemplification mode of predication Fx is equivalent to a relational condition between x and Φ_F . Happily, the theory avoids regress here precisely because the relational condition of participates_{PTA} does *not* define a new relation. The identity formula used in the definition of participates_{PTA} (in §3) is explicitly defined in terms of predications *pros heauto* and these are not allowed in the property comprehension principle (see footnote 11)! Consequently, no Bradley-style regress can get a purchase. Similar remarks apply to participates_{PH}. The definition of participates_{PH} does *not*

'no encoding subformulas'. Both restrictions would rule out $[\lambda z \exists F(zF \& \neg Fz)]$, since ' zF ' is both a formula contained in ' $\exists F(zF \& \neg Fz)$ ' and is a subformula of this formula. However, the latter restriction, unlike the former, would allow $[\lambda z R(z, \iota x(xG))]$, since ' xG ' is an encoding formula which is contained in, but is not a subformula of, ' $R(z, \iota x(xG))$ '.

define a relation, for it too involves predications which can't be used to form new properties (again, see §3).

The last issue concerning the comprehension principle for properties centers around the fact that it still asserts a rather liberal domain of properties, more liberal, perhaps, than Plato might have envisaged. There is some question about how promiscuous Plato was in admitting Forms into his ontology. For example, in the *Parmenides* (130c-d), he suggests that there may not be Forms corresponding to 'mud', 'hair', and the like. In the *Statesman* (262d), he demurs over a Form corresponding to 'barbarian'. Since 'barbarian' was applied by the ancient Greeks to all and only those people that aren't Greek, many scholars take this to be part of the evidence that Plato would object to negative Forms. In addition, the passages where Plato takes the Forms to be simple and without parts are taken by some philosophers to suggest that Plato would not have accepted disjunctive and other complex properties. And generally, the Forms are supposed 'to carve Nature at its joints', while natural language doesn't do any such thing. For example, natural language has it that the animals are divided into 'man' and 'beast'; yet Plato thinks that this is not a correct description of reality (*Statesman* 262).

All of this suggests to us that it would be reasonable to restrict the definition of ' x is a Form of G ' so that Forms correspond only to those properties of the more inclusive theory deemed to be 'Platonically acceptable'. We shall not attempt to define 'Platonically acceptable' properties in the present work, but rather note that if such a notion were defined, the definition of Forms could be restricted in the way just suggested. For example, introduce the notion G *platonically-implies* F ($G \xRightarrow{*} F$) to hold between G and F just in case both G and F are platonically acceptable and G implies F . Then, where G is any platonically acceptable property, one could define a Form of G to be any ideal object that encodes all and only the properties platonically implied by G :

$$x \text{ is a Form of } G =_{df} Ix \ \& \ \forall F(xF \equiv G \xRightarrow{*} F),$$

where G is any platonically acceptable property and the quantifier
 $\forall F$ is restricted to the platonically acceptable properties

So, given some notion of 'platonic acceptability', one can restrict the theory of Forms so that it is only as rich as Plato may have intended it to be. That is, the revised definition would carve out a smaller class of ideal objects than the original definition, and the suggestion is that some

such restriction will 'carve Nature at its joints'.

§7: Answering Objections Raised Against Meinwald

Having dealt with Frances' loophole concerning (NIa) and shown that the rejection of (NIb) is more than 'virtually required', we turn to the other objections that have been leveled against a two-modes-of-predication theory. It is shown in what follows that these objections do not translate into objections for the present account. For the most part, the objections do not allege that Plato never drew a distinction in modes of predication, nor do they challenge Meinwald's claim that such a distinction addresses some aspect of the Third-Man argument. Instead, they focus on various subtleties of *pros heauto* predication. It is time then to investigate whether such subtleties affect the metaphysics of Forms described in §§5 and 6.

Durrant points (1997, 384) to a 'serious difficulty' in Meinwald's account. He observes that Meinwald's notion of *pros heauto* predication is supposed to be a wider notion than self-predication. (For example, 'The Just is virtuous' is a *pros heauto* predication which is not a self-predication.) He then objects that self-predication sentences such as 'The Large is large' and 'The Just is just' do not express *pros heauto* predications because they don't exhibit any of the following three features which are supposed to characterize the wider notion of *pros heauto* predications: (a) expressing part of the nature of something, (b) offering an analysis of the nature of something, and (c) presenting the internal structure of real natures. (a) – (c) characterize *pros heauto* predications because, according to Meinwald, *pros heauto* predications hold in virtue of "a relation internal to the subject's own nature". It seems natural to understand this in the way Durrant does, as saying 'The Just is virtuous' is true because the Form of Virtue is part of the nature of The Just. Durrant then points out that if self-predications were *pros heauto* predications, then 'The Just is just' would be true *because* the Form of Justice is part of the nature of itself. But Durrant claims that nothing can include itself as part of its own nature (because parts are necessarily individuated and reidentified in terms of the wholes of which they are a part).

Our theory deals with this objection in the following way. Even when self-predications are treated as *pros heauto* predications, no Form is a part of its own nature. The reason is that *properties* are the only parts

of the nature of a Form. The parts of Φ_F 's nature are the *properties* implied by the property F . Since Forms are distinct from properties, no Form will be a part of its own nature. Therefore, contra Durrant, in our our friendly amendment to Plato based on two modes of predication, *no* Form includes itself as a part of itself. Meinwald could have adopted this position, as she explicitly notes (1991, 60) and recalls in closing (p. 166).

Although Sayre (1994) endorses Meinwald's two modes of predication in principle,²⁵ he is unconvinced about the specific interpretation she gives to *pros heauto* predication. According to Meinwald, *pros heauto* predication is to be understood on the model of a genus-species tree. She says that:

In such a tree, a kind A appears either directly below or far below another kind B if what it is to be an A is to be a B with certain differentia (or series of differentia) added. That is, the natures of A's and B's are so related that being a B is part of what it is to be an A. (1991, 68)

Sayre is hesitant to understand *pros heauto* predication in terms of genus-species trees because he takes there to be counterexamples to this model. He says (1994, 116):

Animal-hunting is below hunting by stealth. . . accordingly animal-hunting by this account would have to involve stealth by nature. But animal-hunting clearly can be pursued in the open as well.

On our view, the nature of a Form is determined by what the identifying property implies. That is, the nature of Φ_F includes the properties implied by the property of being F . Therefore, if the property of animal-hunting does not imply stealth, then the Form Animal-Hunting cannot have stealth as part of its nature.

Although Sayre cites evidence from the *Sophist* that Plato uses the model of a genus-species tree to construct this account of hunting, it is possible that Plato wasn't expressing himself well at that point. In any case, this sort of criticism doesn't apply to the theory as developed in the present paper, since if the implication that animal-hunting implies stealth does not hold, then the Forms aren't organized in the tree in a problematic way.

²⁵Indeed, Meinwald (1991, 177, footnote 1) credits his (1983) for also drawing the distinction and applying it to the second half of the *Parmenides*.

Concluding Observations

Whatever merits the preceding objections have as criticisms of Meinwald's specific theory, they don't apply to the two-modes-of-predication theory developed here. Meinwald's interpretation of Plato's work contains the seeds of a genuine way to say goodbye to the Third Man. But her specific proposals only say *auf Wiedersehen* to the problem, for they omit important details and fail to consider the consequences of the position. Our friendly amendment to Platonic theory allows us to keep all the genuine insights that Meinwald propounded while at the same time providing us with a logically secure solution.

As mentioned earlier, Plato was not in a position to develop the theory of Forms in this exact manner, and so there is a sense in which he did not say goodbye to the Third Man. But it is clear that the direction indicated in the body of this paper is something he could and would have taken seriously. We believe it offers a much better understanding of the Forms than the alternative, 'paradigm instance' conception of the Forms, where the Form of F is conceived as a 'paradigm instance' of F . One of the main motivations of such a conception is that it provides a way to understand why Plato thought that the predication ' x is F ' (*pros ta alla*) could be *explained* by the claim that x participates in the Form of F . But the paradigm-instance conception of Forms seems *incompatible* with the Self-Predication principle. After all, if the Form of F is a paradigm-instance, then it is natural to think of it as an *instance* of something predicable rather than being itself predicable. And so it seems that in a paradigm-instance theory, the Form of F is not predicable at all—much less self-predicable. Therefore, the paradigm-instance conception would also seem to require a distinction between the Form of F from the property F (otherwise, what are these paradigm-instances instances of?).

However, the paradigm-instance conception has not been developed into a rigorous theory of Forms and it is not clear that it makes perfect sense. An instance x of a property F is typically complete in the sense that, for all other properties G , x is either an instance of G or an instance of the negation of G . But are paradigm-instances complete in this sense? If they are, why should there be exactly one paradigm-instance for each property? Why couldn't there be two complete paradigm-instances which differed with respect to some other (possibly trivial) property, rather than a unique Form? So, a paradigm-instance theorist should claim here that

the Forms, as paradigm-instances, aren't complete; i.e., that the Form of F simply instantiates F and the properties implied by F but instantiates no other properties—this is what makes it a 'paradigm' instance of F . But such a hypothesis can't be true, since the (classical) logic of exemplification (instantiation) rules that objects must be complete: for any property F and for any object x , either x exemplifies F or x exemplifies the negation of F . So there would have to be a special logic for paradigm-instances. Finally, just how is the conception of Forms as paradigm-instances supposed to help us understand why (Plato thought) the predication ' x is F ' is *explained* by the claim that x participates in the Form of F ?

The present theory may offer the best (and perhaps only) way to make sense of the paradigm-instance conception of Forms. The encoding mode of predication presents a sense in which the Forms (and other ideal objects) can be incomplete. In general, ideal objects may be incomplete with respect to the properties they encode (though they are all complete with respect to the properties they exemplify, as classical logic dictates). In other words, there are ideal objects x and properties F such that neither x encodes F nor x encodes the negation of F . Indeed, on our friendly amendment — and perhaps in Plato's original conception — Forms are such incomplete ideal objects. The Form of Justice has a nature that encodes only the property of being just and the properties implied by being just. It neither encodes the property of being a bed nor encodes the negation of that property, nor does it encode any other property. Since the encoding claim ' xF ' is a mode of *predication*, it offers a way for x to be F . So there is a sense in which the Form of F (as we have defined it) is a unique, paradigm way for something to be F , namely, by *being* (*pros heauto*) everything that F implies and by being (*pros heauto*) nothing else. Encoding predication is a way for an object to be F in some *pure* way. It may be that the only sense to be made out of the idea that the Form of F is a 'paradigm-instance' of F is to conceive of it as an ideal object that encodes just F and the properties implied by F .

One final observation is in order, concerning how predication is supposed to be 'explained' by participation. It has often been claimed that Plato appeals to participation in the Form of F to account for the truth of the predication ' x is F *pros ta alla*'. But it is entirely legitimate to ask: Just how does participation in an ideal, abstract object such as the Form of F explain why an ordinary object x is F (*pros ta alla*)? Our

answer to this question is that the *definition* of participation_{PTA} (in §3) articulates a general logical and metaphysical pattern of facts about ordinary objects, ideal objects, and modes of predication. (For example, the definition of participation_{PTA}, when applied to the property of being red, say, captures a metaphysical and logical pattern of facts about ordinary red things, facts about an ideal object, and a particular way of being red. There is an instance of the pattern for each ordinary red thing.) By Theorem 3, we know that the definition of participation_{PTA} tells us, in theoretical terms, that this logical and metaphysical pattern is present whenever an object is F *pros ta alla*. So the definition of participation_{PTA} *systematizes certain logical and metaphysical facts about predication and unifies them within a theory*. This is the sense in which the appeal to participation in a Form explains garden-variety predication. (In a similar way, participation_{PH} explains predication *pros heauto*.) If this is correct, then Plato scholars should now focus on the question of how well this sense of 'explanation' coheres with Plato's other views about the Forms, such as their learnability.

Appendix: Different 'Multiple Modes of Predication' Views of Plato

Many researchers have detected what might be called "different types of predication" in Plato, especially in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*. In this Appendix, we provide a survey of this work. These theories would have Plato distinguishing sentences that are of the "ordinary, everyday type" from those that are of some more exotic type(s). However, not all of these theories actually invoke a real distinction between "different types predication" in the literal sense of the phrase, but instead locate the source of the difference between the ordinary sentences and the exotic ones in aspects of the sentence other than the predication itself. We call these theories *unitarian theories* of predication because, although they acknowledge a difference in types of sentence, they do not recognize different types of predication. A second group of theories *does* hold there to be a distinction between types of predication, but does *not* find there to be a similar distinction between types of participation, instead asserting that sentences manifesting the different types of predication are merely describing the same "reality" in different ways. So, such theories acknowledge that there are different modes of *expressing* relationships among the

Forms, but in effect deny that the reality behind such statements has any aspect that mirrors this purely linguistic distinction. We call such views *many-one theories* because they claim there to be many different modes of predication but only one type of participation. And finally there is a third group of theories that hold there to be not only different modes of predication but also assert that there are different modes of participation which are represented by these differing predications. These are what we call *many-many theories* of predication and participation, because they recognize many different types of predication and distinct types of participation for each.

Owen (1968) is an example of the unitarian view, drawing a distinction between different types of predicates. He says (p. 108):

Given any Platonic Idea, at least two and possibly three very different sorts of thing can be said of it. (A) Certain things will be true of it in virtue of its status as an Idea, e.g., that it is immutable. These predicates (call them ‘A-predicates’) will be true of any Idea whatever. (B) Certain things will be true of it in virtue of the particular concept it represents: these (call them ‘B-predicates’) are sometimes held to fall into two radically distinct groups. (B1) There are predicates which can be applied to the Idea in virtue of the general logical character of the concept for which it stands: thus it will be true of Man that it is, in the scheme of Xenocrates and the Academy, *kath’ hauto* and not *pros ti* or *pros heteron*, and in Aristotle’s scheme that it is (or is an Idea of) substance and not quality, etc. (B2) Other predicates belong to the Idea because, regardless of philosophical disagreements over types or categories of concept (the B1- predicates), they are simply accepted as serving to define the particular concept in question. Man, for instance, is two-footed and an animal.

Although there are different ways to interpret Owen’s thought here, central to his description is the claim that it is the *subject terms* in a sentence which, ultimately, determine what ‘is being said’ when some particular predicate is used in a sentence. Thus, when it is said that man is two-footed and that Socrates is two-footed, two different kinds of things ‘are being said’. But it is not true that there are two different types of predication being employed. There is but one—any difference between the two

statements is to be found in the fact that the predicate is being applied to a certain type of subject term. As Owen is at pains to point out both in this article and in his (1966) where he explicitly discusses Aristotle’s reaction to the Third Man Argument, it is easy to commit a ‘two-level fallacy’ when one affirms and denies that a predicate applies to a Form, but is equivocating as to which ‘what is being said’.

Despite the fact that Owen himself uses the term ‘strong predication’ to describe certain (but not all) of the statements that fall into his B2 ‘bracket’ (1966, 136), and despite the fact that other scholars characterize Owen as a two-modes-of-predication theorist (e.g., Hunt 1997, 19-20, footnote 17; Lewis 1991, 39), it is clear that his view does *not* ascribe to Plato two different types of predication. And even less does he attribute to Plato two different types of participation (or “belonging”). Nor does Owen seem to characterize ‘strong predication’ as some sort of additional ‘emphasis’ (such as necessity or essentiality) to be added to ordinary predication. Instead it is the specific subject terms that give rise to the particular understanding of the sentence as an A statement, a B1 statement, or a B2 statement. An accurate (and non-committal) statement of the relationship between Owen’s B2 statements and Meinwald’s *pros heauto* predications is given by Peterson (1996, 182, footnote 19), who says “The phrase *pros heauto* would attach to those truths which correspond to what Owen calls ‘B2 predicates’.” Thus, although Owen and Meinwald are talking about the same two sets of statements when they make their distinctions, they describe the underlying ground of the distinction differently, identifying different features that set the one group apart from the other group.

Another example of this sort of ersatz two-modes-of-predication theory is provided by those theories that posit ‘predicational complexes’ as distinct classes of entities over and above the normal sort of entity. For example, in addition to Coriscus the person, these theories posit distinct (but spatiotemporally overlapping) entities such as Coriscus the white person (and Coriscus the educated person, etc.). Most of these theories (e.g., Lewis 1991; Matthews 1982) are concerned with an account of Aristotle, and not with other Greek philosophers. Matthen (1983) is an exception, but even he does not find much in the line of Platonic evidence for this type of ontology (as opposed to evidence from Parmenides, Heraclitus, Aristotle, and others). Theories like these, which posit the predicative complexes (also called ‘kooky objects’ in Matthews 1982),

have the resources to emulate the Owen B2 predicate-cum-statements. They could (and do) say that predicating a universal of a kooky object yields an ‘essential’ or *pros heauto* predication if the universal is part of the definition of the predicative complex. Thus saying “The educated Coriscus is educated” or “The white Coriscus is colored” will be their ‘special’ type of predication. But once again, this is only an ersatz two-modes-of-predication theory, for there is not really two distinct types of predication but only unusual objects for ordinary predication to apply to.

The many-one theory views the ‘special’ type of predication as arising from a modification of ordinary predication. For instance, it might view the exotic statements as consisting of necessary truths, or as consisting of ‘real’ or ‘absolute’ truths (as opposed to ‘approximate’ truths). For example, van Fraassen (1969) thinks that Plato’s language in the *Sophist* requires that there be (at least) four different ways to characterize the relations among the Forms (and individuals): *a* blends with *b*, *a* combines with *b*, *a* participates in *b*, and *a* is a part of *b*. In his view, ‘combines’ means ‘is capable of blending’; ‘combines’ therefore is a modal notion; it does *not* indicate a different sort of participation from what ‘combines’ designates, but only a different way of characterizing the relation. Indeed, for van Fraassen, the other three of these four relations are just different ways of describing the univocal notion of participation (which corresponds to our exemplification). He proceeds to give a ‘sympathetic’ account of the apparent logic behind Plato’s argumentation in *Sophist* 251-259. The account is sympathetic in the sense that if certain terms are translated as ‘blends with’ (which he takes to signify a reflexive and symmetric relation), and others are translated as the modal ‘combines with’, etc., then this densely-argued piece of text can be seen as making a certain sort of sense. As van Fraassen puts the issue (1969, 492):

Plato describes, in an intuitive way, certain relationships among the forms. These relationships determine, in turn, certain logical relationships in language, and sometimes (as in the argument that Being and Not-Being are distinct forms) Plato appeals to intuitively grasped logical connections in language to determine relationships among forms. The task of logical theory is to provide a formal representation for the logical interconnections thus exhibited.

Although both the unitarian and many-one theories just canvassed

are quite commonly cited when discussions of “multiple modes of predication/participation in Plato” take place, it is quite clear that they are not really committed to any such theory in any literal sense. None of them except van Fraassen’s even finds different types of predication, much less different types of participation. Rather, the theories divide the sentences used to describe “reality” into different categories. Sometimes the theories trace the cause of such a distinction to the type of subject terms used; sometimes to the type of predicate terms. But in theories of the unitarian sort, there is no distinction with regards to the predication when one compares sentences from the one category with those of another. And in the many-one theory, although there is a difference in predication there is no corresponding difference in participation. So it seems rather a misnomer to call these theories “multiple modes of predication and participation.”

The many-many theory claims there to be more than one type of predication and participation in play when Plato describes the relations that hold among the Forms. These theories assert that there are logically distinct types of statements that can be made even all the while using the same subject-terms, same predicate-terms, and the same linguistic expression of participation. A clear example of such a theory is provided by ones that invoke the notion of ‘Pauline predication’.²⁶ This conception of predication is used to explain why certain sentences, e.g., “Courage is steadfast and temperate”, seem true. The idea is that this predication is most naturally interpreted as “Everyone who is courageous is steadfast and temperate” rather than that the Form Courage or concept of courage exemplifies steadfastness and temperateness. Once it is understood that some apparent “ordinary” predications of properties to kinds are in fact “exotic” predications that transfer the properties to individual instances of the kinds, it is plausible to hold that self-predications are true. Vlastos (1972) argued strongly that this might in fact be the way to understand the Third Largeness argument; there is a similar argument in Peterson (1973). There are various differences between Vlastos’s and Peterson’s detailed explanations of Pauline predication. For example, Vlastos took it to embody some notion of necessity. In his (1973), Vlastos uses the distinction between ‘ordinary predication’ and ‘Pauline predication’ in an explanation of how the course of argumentation in *Sophist* 251-263 proceeds. His conclusion is (pp. 307-308):

²⁶The term was coined by Sandra Peterson (see Vlastos 1972, p. 254, footnote 88; and Peterson 1973).

... while Plato uses ‘B is A’ as an ambiguous sentence-form, taking advantage of its ambiguity to assert it now in one, now in the other, of its alternative uses, he does so *without awareness of the ambiguity*. ... [W]hile the most common reading of ‘B is A’ is the one which means ‘ $N(B \subseteq A)$ ’ ... still, the ambiguity of the sentence-form allows Plato to shift without the least strain to its radically different, ‘ $B \in A$ ’, reading, when this is the use that happens to suit his purpose.

A similar view was expressed by Bostock (1984, 104), although he takes the distinction to be due to the subject-term rather than to be a property of the sentence as a whole. But despite tracing this to the subject term, his theory is different from that of Owen (who also traced it to the subject term). For, one and the same subject term can be used in both types of predication (unlike Owen’s account), and we are presented with two different participation relations. Like Vlastos, Bostock thinks Plato is unaware of the ambiguity.

The ambiguity of the Greek idiom which allows us to form a subject-expression out of the definite article and a neuter adjective (or participle) is well-known. In one use, a phrase such as *to kalon* or *to on* is a generalizing phrase, used to generalize over the things which the adjective is true of (‘whatever is beautiful’, ‘whatever is’). In another it is used as a singular referring expression to refer to the abstract property, characteristic, kind, etc., which the adjective predicates of those things (‘beauty’, ‘being’); in other words it refers to what Plato calls a form (or, in the *Sophist*, a kind). I shall refer to this as its naming use.

As remarked, Vlastos rejects the view that this distinction is due to an ambiguity in the subject. He says (1973, p. 321, footnote 9):

I rejected this option ... on a substantive ground: while advertising the shift in function, from singular to general, in the subject term, this alternative notation would have obscured the still more important fact that for Plato it is exactly the same entity whose dual role commissions it to do both jobs in his ontology: the same metaphysical entity which instantiates the [apparent] singular-term in [Man is_{pp} eternal—‘ordinary

predication’] is itself instantiable, exactly like the [apparent] predicate-term in [Man is_{pp} mortal—‘Pauline predication’]. Plato’s ontology violates on principle the Fregean doctrine that no concept-naming expression may ever be used predicatively (a doctrine which is itself not free from difficulty, entailing, as Frege saw, the paradoxical conclusion that “the concept *horse* is not a concept”) ... For Plato every concept-naming word is systematically ambivalent: it always names a unique metaphysical existent, and yet its principal use is predicative, serving in this capacity not only manifestly, when it occurs in predicate position, but frequently also when its apparent function is only nominative, as, e.g., when it is the subject term of a Pauline predication.

Vlastos and Bostock think, at least in the places just cited, that the ‘special’ type of predication is Pauline, i.e., it is a kind of generalization and therefore different from “ordinary predication.” Since the two modes of predication are different, it follows that they must correspond to distinct types of participation.

This is not the only sort of special predication and participation that some of the many-many theorists have found. And the justification offered for positing the different modes has sometimes been pinned down to specific grammatical usages. Ackrill (1957) thought that sometimes (e.g., in the *Sophist*) when Plato wrote that two forms blended, “the fact being asserted is that some [Form] is (copula) such-and-such ... that is, it is used to express the fact that one concept falls under another.” But sometimes Plato is making “highly general remarks about the connectedness of [Forms], where no definite fact as to any particular [Form] is being stated.” Ackrill traces instances of the former use to having a blending term be followed by a genitive, and the latter to being followed by a dative; and he concludes (p. 220):

... that Plato consciously uses [blending] in two different ways. Sometimes it stands for the general symmetrical notion of ‘connectedness’, sometimes it stands for a determinate non-symmetrical notion, ‘sharing in’.

The main justification for his claim is that (in the cases he inspected, anyway) Plato seemed to use the dative when he was making very general claims but used the genitive when he wanted to make more specific claims.

It is difficult to know just from Ackrill's writings here which mode of predication he thought was 'special'. Perhaps he thought them both 'special', and to be contrasted with ordinary exemplification, or perhaps he viewed the 'determinate non-symmetrical notion' to be ordinary exemplification.

Lorenz and Mittelstrass (1966) also point to the difference in Plato's employment of the genitive and dative when using some of the 'blending' terms, and say (in translation, p. 131):

The construction with the genitive . . . represents an A-relation (e.g., when the forms Man and Mortal are in an A-relation, all men are mortal); while the construction with the dative . . . represents a 'compatibility' relation, or as we want to say, are in an I-relation (e.g., when the forms Man and Laughter are in an I-relation, some man laughs).

Once again, it is not clear whether Lorenz and Mittelstrass consider both of these types of predication to be 'special' and to be contrasted with ordinary exemplification. In this article they do not mention ordinary exemplification.

Pelletier (1990, Chapter 5) also found multiple modes of predication in the *Sophist*. Like Ackrill and Lorenz & Mittelstrass, he traced them to different grammatical features of sentences that contained the various blending terms. He identified three distinct usages: (a) DK-predication, which is indicated by the use of the genitive 'used singularly', (b) UNIO-predication, which is indicated by the use of the genitive 'used generally', and (c) ENIO-predication, which is indicated by the use of the dative. DK-predication [Direct Kind predication] is 'ordinary' predication, and when the subject term is a Form, such predication asserts that this form exemplifies the property indicated by the predicate. UNIO-predication [Universally Necessary, Indirect Object predication] occurs when the subject term is a Form, but instead of the predicate term alleging that the subject exemplifies a property, it 'defers' to the instances of the subject. It is universal and necessary, in Pelletier's interpretation, so that when *G* is UNIO-predicated of the Form of *F*, what is asserted is that it is nomically necessary for every instance of *F* to exemplify *G*. ENIO-predication [Existentially Necessary, Indirect Object predication] is similar to UNIO-predication except that it is existential and necessary: when *G* is ENIO-predicated of the Form of *F*, what is asserted is that it is nomically necessary for some instance of *F* to exemplify *G*. Pelletier claimed that

the truth conditions for these three different types of predication involved three different types of participation.

The preceding accounts, no matter from which of our three sorts, find Plato distinguishing more than one type of sentence. Theories of the unitarian variety are likely to locate the basis for the distinction as a feature of the different sorts of subject terms used in the sentences of one category as opposed to those in the other(s). Theories of the many-one variety are likely to locate the basis of the distinction as a feature of the language used to describe the background reality, which is taken to manifest only one sort of participation. And theories of the many-many sort locate the basis of the distinction as a matter of differences in the background reality being described, that is, in different types of participation.

But for all the authors so far canvassed, it is fair to say that the reason they feel justified in attributing their distinction to Plato is a matter of "sympathetically reading" Plato, in the sense of trying to find some *overall* point of view that will generate a plausible interpretation of his writings. That is, they ascribe these thoughts to Plato with an eye to bringing forth 'obvious truths' (as when Owen describes the different types of predicates), or with an eye to making sense of various pronouncements that Plato made (as when Ackrill or Pelletier attempt to describe the course of the argumentation in the *Sophist*), or with an eye to giving an explanation as to why Plato didn't seem to be aware various logical points (as when Vlastos ascribes Pauline predication to Plato, or as Bostock accounts for Plato's failure to recognize the fallaciousness of his reasoning in the *Sophist*).

There is another tradition of attributing different modes of predication and participation to Plato. This tradition focuses instead on some particular thing that Plato says in some particular place, and authors in this tradition tie their multiple-modes-of-predication account to this specific point in Plato. Usually this approach turns on the notions of *kath' hautō* ('by way of itself') and *pros ti allo* ('with respect to something else'), which are mentioned both in the *Parmenides* (136a6, 136b3, 136c1) and in the *Sophist* (255c12-13, 255d4-5). In these places Plato seems to be distinguishing cases (of predication and participation) where the subject is related to something other than itself from cases where it isn't. This under-explained distinction has been given a variety of analyses by different commentators.

Sometimes these expressions are used with ‘being’ as the predicate, so that Plato says, for example, that there are two different ways of having being (see *Sophist* passages for this, especially). If one has this topic in mind, it is easy to interpret “*x* is, by way of itself” as introducing an ‘existential’ sense of ‘is’; by contrast, “*x* is, by way of another” can then be seen as introducing a ‘predicative’ sense of ‘is’. [See, e.g., Ackrill (1957) and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1996, 176, footnote 17).] Another way to view such claims would be to think of it as distinguishing identity claims from other predications; after all, to say that “*x* is *y* by way of itself” seems very much like saying that “*x* and *y* are identical”. This sort of interpretation of *pros heauto* predication has seemed to some to provide the necessary sense to account for the difference between saying that the Empire State Building is large and that the Form Largeness is large. The latter is *pros heauto* predication, and therefore asserts an identity claim. [See Allen (1960), Bestor (1980).] So this type of two-modes-of-predication view separates ‘ordinary’ predication from identity statements. A problem with this interpretation of *pros heauto* predication is that it does not place such predications as “Justice is a virtue” into the *pros heauto* side of the divide between predications, as they obviously should be classified.

Related to the view that *pros heauto* predications are identity claims are the views of Moravcsik (1963) and Nehamas (1978, 1982), who take the self-predicative *pros heauto* predications as asserting the identity of a Form with its essence:

The Form Justice displays the essence of justice.
 The Form Justice is what it is to be just.
 The Form Justice is an instantiation of the essence of justice.

Now, if these are taken as being identity claims then they will be in the same boat as the just-mentioned theories, in that they would fall short of giving an adequate account of *pros heauto* predication by not being able to make “Justice is a virtue” be a *pros heauto* predication. But perhaps Nehamas and Moravcsik mean that such predications express necessary or essential properties of the subject, and therefore “Justice is a virtue” will become *pros heauto*. However, in this case they will find themselves owing a further explanation of why such predications do not result in a Third Man argument. After all, under such an account, the Form Justice not only is what it is to be just and not only displays the essence of justice,

but also *is* just! If it isn’t, some further account, over and above the notions of necessary or essential property, of just what sort of predication they are describing is required. Possibly they are thinking of predication along the lines of Meinwald or Peterson (as described in the main body of this paper) or of Frede (as to be described immediately below). But if so, they haven’t said this.

Frede (1967, 1992) explains the distinction between *kath’ hauto* and *pros allo* predication in the *Sophist* not, as Ackrill (1957) had thought, in terms of an ‘existential’ vs. ‘predicative’ sense of ‘is’, but rather as follows (1992, 400):

Socrates is or is a being, for instance, in being white. But white is not something Socrates is by himself; it is something he only is by being appropriately related to something else, namely the color white. He only is a being in this particular way, or respect, namely in being white, by standing in a certain relation to something else, namely color. He is white, not by being this feature, but by having this feature. He is white, as we may say, by ‘participation’ in something else. The color, on the other hand, is said to be white, not by participating in, by having, this feature, but by being it.

Frede finishes his short discussion of the two modes of predication in his (1992) with this (p. 402):

This allows us to distinguish different kinds of self-predication and to claim that the kind of self-predication Plato had been interested in all along, and continues to hold on to, is the one that innocuously involves the first use of ‘...is...’.

That is, the Form of *X* is said to be *X* in virtue of *being* the property *X* and not by *having* the property *X*.

Meinwald’s (1991, 1992) interpretation of *pros heauto* and *pros ta alla* predication in the *Parmenides* is an outgrowth of her understanding of Frede’s (1967) interpretation of the similar distinction in the *Sophist* (which we just mentioned). In addition to her claims that were cited in the main body of this paper, here is another statement of her position (1992, 378):

These phrases belong to the kind of use of the Greek preposition *pros* (‘in relation to’) in which a sentence of the form

‘A is B in relation to (*pros*) C’ indicates that some relation unnamed in the sentence is relevant to A’s being B. In cases of this kind, the context provides information that allows identification of the relation in question. In the *Parmenides*, the in-relation-to qualifications indicate the relations that ground each of the two kinds of predication. In this way, they mark a difference in the way in which B can be predicated of A. Thus, the difference between what holds of a subject in relation to itself and what holds of the same subject in relation to the other is not simply due to the distinction between the others and the subject. It derives more fundamentally from the fact that a different relation is involved in each kind of case. A predication of a subject in relation to itself holds in virtue of a relation internal to the subject’s own nature, and so can be employed to reveal the structure of that nature. A predication in relation to the others by contrast concerns its subject’s display of some feature, which Plato takes to be conformable in general to something other—namely the nature associated with that feature.

It is important to note that Meinwald’s view is explicit in its adoption of two types of participation (“a different relation is involved”) in addition to the two types of predication, thus forcibly claiming hers to be a many-many theory.

Peterson (1996), departing from her earlier (1973) ‘Pauline predication’ interpretation of the different-modes-of-predication, now agrees with Meinwald’s assessment of *pros heauto* and *pros ta alla* predication, with the exception that she claims (181, footnote 18) “not to fully understand Meinwald’s talk of natures”. Peterson also believes that Meinwald’s explanation in terms of Species/Genus trees unjustifiably imports later Aristotelian notions into the explication of Plato. For these reasons she would prefer to see that “*x* is *F pros heauto*” be understood as saying that *x* mentions *F* as part of its definition.

* * *

In the main body of this paper we have made a number of points that are relevant to any multiple-modes-of-predication interpretation of Plato. And any of the theories of multiple-modes-of-predication mentioned here in the Appendix has to acknowledge the following issues.

First, all such views are committed to the One-Over-Many principle for each of the modes of predication. Secondly, these interpretations need to evaluate *each* mode of predication for susceptibility to the Third Man Argument. On our friendly amendment, *every* Form is *pros heauto* self-predicable; and this means that all interpretations that agree with the friendly amendment must also be committed to denying the *pros heauto* Non-Identity assumption (NIb) for every Form, on pain of falling prey to the Third Man Argument. A third issue concerns whether *pros heauto* predications implies the corresponding *pros ta alla* predication. Two-modes-of-predication theorists who agree with Meinwald when she says (1992, 387), “so the Form does not become yet another thing that can generate another group of things that need the machinery all cranked up again”, are committed to denying such an entailment. In developing the friendly amendment to Plato, we have also answered this question in the negative, and have even proved it for some cases. Thus, any two-modes-of-predication interpretation of Plato must come to grips with these results: (1) that they *must* deny the entailment in at least some cases, (2) that they are free to allow the entailment in a wide range of cases, but they need to specify which ones, and (3) that whenever they do allow the entailment for some particular Form X, they are then committed to denying the *pros ta alla* version of the Non-Identity assumption (NIa) for X. For example, if the Form of Justice is claimed to be one of the Forms for which the inference fails, such an interpretation has to face the fact that then the Form of Justice does *not* exemplify justice. But in that case the resulting theory owes an explanation of how Plato could think that just objects and actions in the phenomenal world can be said to exemplify the property of being just, when all along the Form of Justice does not exemplify this property.

Even if the various theories we have canvassed were to formulate a position on all these issues, they would still not have done what we accomplished with our version of a multiple-modes-of-predication theory—viz., they would not have derived Plato’s principles from still more general principles. Instead they would have merely *asserted* the features of Plato’s theory.

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